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Abstract
The paper considers two-person bargaining under Approval Voting. It first
proves the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Then it shows that this bargain-
ing method ensures that both players obtain at least their average and median
utility level in equilibrium. Finally it proves that, provided that the players are
partially honest, the mechanism triggers sincerity and ensures that no alterna-
tive Pareto dominates the outcome of the game.
JEL Codes: C78; D7.
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1 Introduction
We study a very simple and intuitive mechanism for two players which is shown to
exhibit appealing properties. This mechanism, the Approval Mechanism, is a one-
step procedure in which each player announces a subset of the alternatives as their
“approved” ones, the most approved alternatives are declared winners, and ties are
broken with a uniform lottery. The Approval Mechanism is simply the Approval
Voting rule with two players.
∗The authors would like to thank Steve Brams, Gorkem Celik, Se´bastien Courtin, Eric Danan, Ar-
naud Dellis, Bhaskar Dutta, Ani Guerdjikova, Allison Koriyama, Yukio Koriyama, Michele Lombardi,
Antonin Mace´, Massimo Morelli, Klaus Nehring, Motty Perry, Marcus Pivato, Carmelo Rodriguez-
Alvarez, Marco Scarsini and Arunava Sen for useful comments and suggestions.
†CNRS-University of Cergy-Pontoise (THEMA, UMR 8184). Corresponding author. Email:
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Voting rules are usually conceived for many players,1 but the two-person case
also has practical interest for resolving two-person disputes. Potential applications
may also include jury selection in the US or agenda-setting situations in the political
arena when there are only two dominant parties. To our knowledge, ours is the first
work to explore the properties of Approval Voting as a two-player bargaining device.
Given the tie-breaking rule, we thus consider the following setting:
(i) there is a finite set of pure alternatives,
(ii) two individuals have von Neumann–Morgenstern preferences over pure alter-
natives,
(iii) the game outcomes are the uniform lotteries2 over subsets of alternatives.
This framework is hence different from the usual ones in bargaining or implementa-
tion theory in which it is usually assumed that the game outcome can be either any
of the alternatives or any possible lottery over the alternatives3.
We use pure strategy equilibria as a predictive device. Despite the two players
moving simultaneously, a pure strategy equilibrium exists for any preference pro-
file. The proof is constructive and proceeds as follows: it first builds a sequence
of iterated best responses and then proves that this sequence leads to an equilib-
rium. Moreover, the equilibrium obtained by this construction is sincere. We prove
that there can be two types of equilibria: consensual and non-consensual ones. In a
consensual equilibrium, both agents announce a single common alternative, which
is thus outcome. In a non-consensual one, the sets of announced alternatives are
disjoint and there is thus a tie among several alternatives.
1 For recent theoretical work on Approval Voting in elections with a large number of voters, see
Myerson [2002], Laslier [2009], Nu´n˜ez [2010, 2013], Goertz and Maniquet [2011], Bouton and Cas-
tanheira [2012], Courtin and Nu´n˜ez [2013] and Ahn and Oliveros [2011] among others.
2 Our results still hold if we relax these assumptions according to which lotteries are uniform or
the agents have vN-M utilities. Section 8.2 proves that the current results are valid if one suitably
weakens the previously described assumptions.
3 These literatures are vast, and we do not attempt here to give a full review. Several works
have studied bargaining over a finite set of alternatives. Most of them take an ordinal approach and
leave preference intensities out of the setting. Among those, sequential procedures (in particular the
“fallback” bargaining method) have attracted a considerable interest (Sprumont [1993], Hurwicz and
Sertel [1999], Brams and Kilgour [2001], Anbarci [2006],Kıbrıs and Sertel [2007] and De Clippel and
Eliaz [2012]). A related literature considers problems with a finite number of alternatives and focuses
on cardinal rules, as we do. The Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions have been characterized
in this setting (Mariotti [1998]; Nagahisa and Tanaka [2002]).
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We then prove that this rule satisfies three normative properties: Random Lower
Bound (RLB), Sincerity (S) and Pure Pareto Efficiency (P P E).
The first property, RLB, is the natural adaptation of the classical axiom of Equal-
Division Lower Bound in fair allocation settings (see for instance Kolm [1973], Pazner
[1977] and Thomson [2010] for a review of the literature). It simply states that a
mechanism should always assign to a player at least the expected level of utility she
would obtain if the selected alternative was chosen at random, uniformly among
all available alternatives. In other words, in any equilibrium, the expected utility
for each player is at least equal to her mean utility, which would be achieved using
the uniform lottery over the whole set of alternatives. Random Lower Bound hence
ensures a minimal level of utility to both players, from an ex-ante point of view.
It can be argued that this property is quite mild since, intuitively, it seems that
one could design mechanisms that ensure strictly more utility than the random
lower bound to both players. However, we prove that this intuition is wrong since,
simply, such an outcome need not exist for all utility profiles. In other words, the
random lower bound is the highest level of minimal utility for both players one can
ensure.
Moreover, in our setting, in which the outcomes coincide with the uniform lot-
teries, the mean expected utility coincides with the median one. This precludes the
discussion of whether it is fairer to require that a mechanism deliver the mean vs.
the median expected utility.4
As to Sincerity, we use the classical definition under Approval Voting: a ballot
is sincere when a player approves and alternative, she also approves all the alterna-
tives she ranks higher. We first recall that a strategic player may vote non-sincerely
in a Nash equilibrium. Yet, this sincerity violation is shown to be quite mild in
the following sense of “partial honesty”. The idea of partial honesty is simple (see
Matsushima [2008], Dutta and Sen [2012], Kartik and Tercieux [2012] and ? for
applications in Nash implementation). A partially honest player is one who votes
sincerely when voting sincerely maximizes her utility. Suppose, for instance, that
a player hesitates between voting for her preferred alternative or approving of just
4De Clippel et al. [2013] design sequential mechanisms that satisfy a related property (the “min-
imal satisfaction” condition): these mechanisms deliver at least the median pure utility level to both
players (see also ?? for recent work on sequential procedures based on lists). Similarly, Conley and
Wilkie [2012] define the ordinal egalitarian solution with finite choice sets. This solution suggests
the middle ranked alternative (or a lottery over the two middle ranked alternatives) of the Pareto set
as an outcome.
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her first and third preferred ones (a non-sincere ballot). Suppose that both ballots
deliver the same outcome, so that a classical strategic player would be indifferent.
In this case, a partially honest player will not cast the non-sincere ballot. Such a
player has a very limited preference for honesty: she acts honestly only if this is not
detrimental to her. We will show that, in our setting, the behavioral assumption of
partial honesty removes insincerity in equilibrium: if players are partially honest,
they are sincere in every equilibrium.
As far as Pareto Efficiency is concerned, the first remark is that, with just three
alternatives, this mechanism is Lottery Pareto efficient in the sense that no lottery
Pareto dominates, in the usual sense, an equilibrium of the game. Yet, this result
does not extend to more than three alternatives. However, the Approval Mecha-
nism satisfies the weaker notion of Pure Pareto Efficiency. We will prove that no
equilibrium of the game can be Pareto dominated by a (pure) alternative as long
as the players are partially honest. Note that the previous property singles out the
Approval mechanism. We will prove that there does not exist a social choice cor-
respondence that satisfies Random Lower-Bound and Pure Pareto Efficiency while
being fully implementable in pure strategies (independently of whether the agents
are or not partially honest). Indeed, the Approval mechanism partially implements
the set of uniform lotteries that jointly satisfy the previously mentioned conditions.
We finally consider two variations of the mechanism. We first focus on whether
our results extend to mixed strategies. Whereas RLB still holds, the sincerity of play-
ers’ best responses is not anymore valid. This is shown by an example which proves
that mixed strategies might trigger counterintuitive probability distributions over
the different pivotal outcomes.5 This hints at the following conclusion: equilibria in
pure strategies are the most adequate framework to study the current mechanism.
The second variation concerns the uniform tie-breaking rule. In this extension,
we relax this assumption and allow for alternative rules. More specifically, we give
two axioms that determine how the players derive their preferences over the sets
of alternatives from their preferences over single alternatives. Under these axioms,
we prove that the mechanism still admits a pure strategy equilibrium. Moreover,
the existence of a sincere best response is still ensured. This variation show that our
results are not tight to the assumption of uniform tie-breaking nor to the assumption
5 The possibility of such paradoxical but rational behavior under Approval Voting already ap-
peared in the game-theoretical literature in De Sinopoli et al. [2006].
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of VNM evaluation of outcomes.
The rest of this work is structured as follows. After discussing an example on the
potential applications of the mechanism in Section 2, Section 3 presents the setting,
and the proof of existence of pure strategy equilibria is included in Section 4. Sec-
tion 5 shows that the Approval Mechanism satisfies the RLB property, and Section
6 deals with the concept of partial honesty. Section 7 presents the results related
to Pareto efficiency and Section 8 describes the previously described extensions. Fi-
nally, Section 9 offers some concluding comments.
2 An example
The objective of the following example is to show the usefulness of the Approval
mechanism: it correctly aggregates the players’ intensities of preferences while satis-
fying a minimal degree of utility to both of them. This example is very much related
to the framework of ? which study compromising under incomplete information6.
There are two parties, say Blue and Red, who have to choose which topic they
would include on today’s agenda. There are three possible topics : education, health
and taxation, respectively denoted e, h and t. Only one topic can be included in
the agenda. The parties have perfectly opposed preferences with B preferring e to h
and h to t and R having the inverse preferences. To represent these preferences, we
endow each party with a utility vector that represents his cardinal utilities over each
of the different items, as follows:
uB = (100,x,0) and uR = (0, y,100),
with 0 < x,y < 100.
Given this conflict situation, we are concerned with two basic questions:
(a) Is there an outcome more desirable for both players than a random draw?
(b) Can we achieve this outcome in the equilibrium of a mechanism?
6More specifically, they study the case in which two agents have to choose one among the three
available alternatives. They assume that the agents’ preferences are perfectly opposed and find an
impossibility result in the sense that mechanisms which “truthfully elicit utilities and implement
efficient decisions do not exist” (efficiency is defined in an utilitarian manner). See also ? for a related
work.
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The Approval procedure
We answer both questions in the affirmative.
As far as the question (a) is concerned, note that both players’ preferences seem
irreconcilable. Thus, the uniform draw (picking one of the options at random) seems
to be particularly interesting. This outcome implies that each party gets, in expected
utility, her average outcome. Therefore, the random draw ensures each player a
minimal amount of utility and seems to be a good benchmark.7
Yet, depending on the players’ intensities of preferences, both players might strictly
prefer some other lottery. For instance, it might be the case that both players prefer
their middle rank option h to the random draw eht (when x,y > 50). In this case,
using the random draw seems less well-grounded. As depicted by the next table,
for each specification of the preference intensities (x and y), there is a unique lottery
that delivers each player at least his average expected utility while not being Pareto
dominated.
Preference Intensities Outcome
x,y > 50 h
x > 50 and y < 50 eht
x < 50 and y > 50 eht
x,y < 50 et
Regarding question (b), the answer is also affirmative: for all parameter values,
the Approval Mechanism has, in this example, a unique equilibrium, whose outcome
coincides with the lottery described by the table.
To get the intuition, consider the case in which x,y > 50. Let us recall that each
player selects a subset of the alternatives. Since both players prefer h to the lottery
eht, it follows that independently of the undominated strategy of the opponent, they
always select their most preferred alternative and their middle-ranked one (i.e. h).
This proves that in equilibrium, the unique outcome is a consensus over h. A similar
claim applies to the rest of specifications of preference intensities, proving the claim.
In general, that is for any number of alternatives, we prove that the mechanism
satisfies the following properties which underline its interest for both theoretical
and practical work. The outcome is at least as good, for both players, as a random
draw, and is not Pareto dominated by a pure alternative. Moreover, under the mild
7 See Eliaz and Rubinstein [2013] for experimental work on the fairness of random procedures.
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assumption of partial honesty, a player is sincere in equilibrium in the usual sense:
if he includes an alternative on his ballot, he also includes all the options he prefers
to it.
Alternative Procedures
Up to now, we have not justified our focus on the Approval Mechanism. Can
other procedures lead to the same equilibria outcomes? As we now discuss, this
seems hard to achieve at least with simple procedures.
First, observe that no deterministic mechanism can achieve the desiderata of be-
ing Pareto efficient and ensuring a minimal amount of utility to both voters, since
in the example, the unique possible outcome may require in some cases to use a
lottery. Note that the same limitation also applies to the Rubinstein’s alternative
vetoes-offers bargaining mechanism. This mechanism implies in our setting that
players alternatively offer one pure alternative and then decide whether to accept or
reject his opponent’s offer. This procedure is either infinitely repeated or repeated a
finite number of times in which some exogenous payoff is allowed to both players.
Therefore, the outcome can be either a pure alternative or some exogenous disagree-
ment point. Thus, the sort of inefficiency in which we focus in this work seems
unavoidable.
Second, observe that our idea consists of using a voting device in this sort of
environment. What prevents us from letting the players using other voting rules?
Take the most studied voting rules: the positional or scoring rules. Under such
rules in a three-alternative context, a player chooses a vector (1, s,0), s ∈ [0,1], and
assigns 1 point to one alternative, s points to some other alternative and 0 to the
remaining one. The scores are summed, and the alternative with the most votes is
elected. For instance, Plurality Voting corresponds to s = 0, the Borda rule to s = 1/2,
and Negative Voting to s = 1.
In the agenda-setting situation, we prove that for some specification of the play-
ers’ intensities, no equilibrium under these rules satisfies our desiderata. In other
words, no scoring rule can achieve the same outcome as the one obtained through
the Approval Mechanism.8
Take first the Plurality rule with vector (1,0,0). Each player is always better-
off by voting for his most preferred alternative (he is pivotal independently of the
8 The equilibria we find under these rules follow closely the equilibrium behavior described by
Myerson [2002] in Poisson games.
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other player’s strategy); the unique equilibrium outcome is the lottery et, which is
inefficient if for instance x,y > 50. A similar argument holds for any s ∈ [0,1/2),
proving that none of these rules can be optimal in the previously described sense.
Take now the Negative Voting method with vector (1,1,0). Simple computations
prove that the unique equilibrium is that both voters vote for their two better alter-
natives, which leads to the victory of h. This outcome is inefficient unless x,y > 50. A
similar argument remains true as long as s ∈ (1/2,1], proving that every equilibrium
leads to the victory of h implying that these rules are inefficient.
Finally, we need to address the case under the Borda rule in which s = 1/2. Note
first that there is no equilibrium with this rule in which the outcome equals et. In-
deed, if the outcome is et, the players have voted (1,0,1/2) and (1/2,0,1). Hence,
each player can attain the victory of his preferred alternative by deviating to his sin-
cere strategy. However, as previous discussed, if x,y < 50, et is the efficient outcome,
proving that this rule is also inefficient.
3 The Game
There are two players i = 1,2 and a finite set X = {x,y, ..., } of at least two alternatives.
Both players vote simultaneously. A player can approve as many alternatives as she
wishes by choosing a vector Bi from the set of pure strategy vectors Bi = 2X . For
instance, with three alternatives, we have:
Bi ∈
{
(1,0,0), (0,1,0), (0,0,1), (1,1,0), (1,0,1), (0,1,1), (0,0,0), (1,1,1)
}
.
Note that each ballot can also be represented as a subset of the set of alternatives,
so that we often use the notation Bi ⊆ X.
A strategy profile B = (B1,B2) belongs to B = B1 × B2. Let sx(B) be the number
of votes (the score) for alternative x if the strategy profile is B, and let sx(B−i) be the
score for alternative x when the vote of i is excluded. The vector s(B) = (sx(B))x∈X
stands for the total score vector. Note that for each x ∈ X, sx(B) ∈ {0,1,2} since there
are just two players. The winning set of alternatives, that is, the outcome corre-
sponding to B, is denoted by W (B) and consists of those alternatives that get the
maximum total score:
W (B) = {x ∈ X | sx(B) = max
y∈X sy(B)}.
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Each player i ∈ N is endowed with a strict ordering over the set of alternatives
X. We assume that preferences can be represented by a von Neumann–Morgenstern
utility function ui : X→ R over lotteries on the set of alternatives.9 Each ui belongs
to Ui , the set of utilities for a player. Given that ties are broken by a fair lottery, the
expected utility of a player i is a function of the strategy profile B given by:
Ui(B) =
1
#W (B)
∑
x∈W (B)
ui(x).
Slightly abusing notation, we writeUi(W ) to denote the expected utility of a player i
corresponding to the winning set W ⊆ X. Letting u = (u1,u2) ∈ U1 ×U2, the strategic
form voting game Γ is then defined by Γ = (u,B).
We impose the following condition to ensure that each player has a well-defined
strict preference order over the different winning sets: ∀i,B,B′ with
W (B) ,W (B′) =⇒Ui(W (B)) ,Ui(W (B′)). (1)
This condition implies that no player is indifferent between any pair of alternatives,
and moreover no player is indifferent between any pair of winning sets. The con-
dition is generically satisfied with respect to the values of the utilities. For instance
it is satisfied with probability 1 if one picks (u1,u2) from a probability distribution
continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure in R2#X . We thus refer to this
assumption as a genericity assumption.
A unanimous society10 u is a utility vector with for some y ∈ X, ui(y) > ui(x)
∀x ∈ X \ {y}, and a non-unanimous society is a utility vector which is not unanimous.
We mainly focus on pure strategy equilibria. An equilibrium is, as usual, a strat-
egy profile B = (B1,B2) such that each player is playing a best response to the other
player’s strategy.
9 Since the game outcomes are the uniform lotteries over the elements of X, one can weaken
the assumption of von Neumann–Morgenstern preferences without altering the results (see ? for a
discussion on this point). Moreover, most of our results can be easily extended to even more general
assumptions on how players evaluate sets of (tied) alternatives. This point is explained in section 8.2.
10 We might say “couple” intead of “society.”
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4 Existence of equilibrium
As previously mentioned, the focus of the paper is on pure strategy equilibria. We
start with a preliminary obvious observation.
Lemma 1. There is no equilibrium with no approved alternatives.
Proof. If there are no approved alternatives, every alternative gets chosen with 0
votes. Then a player can vote for her preferred alternative, which will be the out-
come. Because we have assumed that there are at least two different alternatives and
ruled out indifferences, this is a strict improvement. Q.E.D.
We distinguish the equilibria according to the maximal score of the alternatives,
which can be 1 or 2, given Lemma 1.
Equilibria Types. We say that an equilibrium is consensual when the maximal
score of the alternatives equals 2. In such an equilibrium, at least one alternative is
simultaneously approved by both players. An equilibrium is non-consensual if the
maximal score equals one. In this case, no alternative is approved by both players.
Winning Sets. The winning set of a consensual equilibrium is a singleton. To
see why, assume that there are several alternatives approved by both players, Then
player i is then strictly better off voting only for his preferred alternative among
those, making it the sole winner. (A formal proof is provided in the proof of the next
theorem.) Hence in a consensual equilibrium one and only one alternative is ap-
provoved simultaneaouly by both players and this single alternative is the outcome.
Since both players vote for disjoint sets of alternatives in a non-consensual equilib-
rium, all the approved alternatives are in the winning set, which thus contains at
least two alternatives. Proposition 3 in the Appendix provides a simple characteri-
zation of these equilibria: (B1,B2) is a non-consensual equilibrium iff B1∩B2 , ∅ and
for i = 1,2, Bi = {x ∈ X : ui(x) > ui(B1 ∪B2)}.
While traditional existence results need mixed strategies, our focus is on pure
strategies. The next result proves that pure equilibria exist. The proof is original
and constructive. It builds a sequence of iterated best responses and proves that at
some step, both players must be playing a best response against each other. As an
important by-product of the proof, we prove that there is at least one sincere equilib-
rium in pure strategies, i.e. an equilibrium in which both players cast sincere ballots.
Indeed, in the equilibrium built in the proof, if a player approves of a candidate, she
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also approves of all the candidates she prefers to this candidate (see Section 6 for a
discussion of sincerity).
Theorem 1. There exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which both players are sincere.
Proof. In the first part of the proof, we describe precisely the players’ best responses.
In the second part, we select a best response function for each player and define a
sequence of iterated best responses. Finally, we show that this sequence at some
point provides a pure strategy equilibrium. Within the proof, we use labellings of
the alternatives such that:
u1(a1) > u1(a2) > . . . > u1(ak), and u2(b1) > u2(b2) > . . . > u2(bk).
In other words, ai and bj respectively stand for the ith and jth preferred alternative
for players 1 and 2. The notation [x,+]i stands for the upper-contour set of alterna-
tive x for player i so that
[x,+]i = {y ∈ X |ui(y) ≥ ui(x)}.
Also, in order to avoid multiple notation for utilities, we denote by Ui(Y ,Z) the
utility achieved by player i when player 1 plays Y and player 2 plays Z. Observe
that if Y ∩ Z , ∅, the outcome is the uniform lottery on Y ∩ Z so that, with our
notation, Ui(Y ,Z) = Ui(Y ∩Z) in that case. If Y ∩Z = ∅ then it equals Ui(Y ∪Z), or
Ui(X) in the special case where Y = Z = ∅.
Part 1: Best Responses:
Let Z ⊆ X denote the vote of player 2. Let Y ⊆ X be a best response for player 1
to Z. There are two cases: either Y ∩Z , ∅ or Y ∩Z = ∅.
Case 1: Y ∩Z , ∅
In this case, the winning setW (Y ,Z) equals Y ∩Z, and we will now see that Y ∩Z
must be a singleton. Indeed, assume that there is more than one alternative in Y ∩Z,
and let y0 ∈ Y ∩Z be such that u1(y0) = maxz∈Z u1(z). Then U1(Y ,Z) = U1(Y ∩Z) =
1
#Y∩Z
∑
z∈Y∩Z u1(z). However, since y0 satisfies u1(y0) > u1(z) for any z ∈ Y ∩Z \ {y0},
it follows that U1(y0,Z) = u1(y0) > U1(Y ,Z), proving that Y is not a best response.
It follows that Y is of the form Y = {y0} ∪ Y ′ for any Y ′ ⊂ X \ Z. In particular,
notice that one can choose
Y = [y0,+]1.
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The expected utility of player 1 equals U1(Y ,Z) = u1(y0) in that case.
Case 2: Y ∩Z = ∅
First note that Y = Z = ∅ is impossible, because the best response to Z = ∅ is
Y = {a1}. Therefore, in case 2, the winning set W (Y ,Z) is equal to Y ∪Z.
Still denote y0 ∈ Z the alternative such that u1(y0) = maxz∈Z u1(z). It must be the
case that U1(Y ,Z) = U1(Y ∪ Z) > u1(y0). Indeed, U1(y0,Z) = u1(y0) and, since Y is
a best response to Z, U1(Y ,Z) > U1(y0,Z) = u1(y0).11 Hence, for any z ∈ Z, we can
write U1(Y ∪Z) > u1(y0) ≥ u1(z).
Moreover, for any y ∈ Y , u1(y) > U1(Y ∪Z). Indeed, since Y is a best response to
Z, it is a better response than Y \ {y}, thus
U1(Y ,Z) ≥U1(Y \ {y},Z) =U1(Y ∪Z \ {y}).
Thanks to the genericity condition, the inequality is strict, and one can write:
1
#(Y ∪Z)
∑
z∈Y∪Z
u1(z) >
1
[#(Y ∪Z)− 1]
∑
z∈Y∪Z\{y}
u1(z),
⇐⇒ [#(Y ∪Z)− 1]u1(y) >
∑
z∈Y∪Z\{y}
u1(z),
⇐⇒ u1(y) > 1[#(Y ∪Z)]
∑
z∈Y∪Z
u1(z) =U1(Y ∪Z),
as wanted.
Similar reasoning shows conversely that, if z ∈ X satisfies u1(z) > U1(Y ∪Z), then
z ∈ Y .
In other words, Y is uniquely defined such that:
Y = {x ∈ X : u1(x) > u1(Y ∪Z)} = [z0,+]1
for some z0 ∈ X. In this case, u1(Y ,Z) = U1([z0,+]1 ∪ Z). Since Y is unique, z0 is
well-defined.
Conclusion of Part 1
For any Z ⊆ X, we have found the best responses Y to Z for player 1. In case 1
(Y ∩Z , ∅), there is a set of best responses to which [y0,+]1 belongs. In the second
11Note that different winning sets must lead to different payoffs due to the genericity condition.
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case, there is a unique best response; it equals [z0,+]1.
Building on this analysis, Part 2 defines a sequence of best responses.
Part 2: Best Response Selection and Iterated Best Responses
For any Z ⊆ X played by player 2, we specify a unique best response of player 1,
denoted Y =R1(Z), as follows:
1. If the best responses to Z lead to some Y with Y ∩Z , ∅, then R1(Z) = [y,+]1
with y such that u1(y) = maxz∈Z u1(z). In this case, W (Y ,Z) = {y}.
2. If, on the contrary, the best response to Z leads to some Y with Y ∩Z = ∅, then
R1(Z) = {x ∈ X : u1(x) > u1(Y ∪Z)} = [z,+]1 for z ∈ X \Z defined in the text.
The same definition applies to yield a best response function R2 of player 2.
Hence, for each player, we have selected from the best response correspondence a
best response function that yields a unique response to any possible ballot of the
other player.
Let Y0 = {a1} (where a1 is the preferred alternative for player 1) and, for any
integer t ≥ 0, define  Y2t+1 =R2(Y2t),Y2t+2 =R1(Y2t+1).
This definition generates a sequence of strategy profiles (Y0,Y1), (Y2,Y1), (Y2,Y3), . . ..
Note that Yt stands for the strategy of player 1 if t is even and for the one of player 2
when t is odd. Part 3 proves that this sequence contains an equilibrium.
Part 3: Reaching an equilibrium
We will first prove, by induction, that non-consensual best responses are increas-
ing:
Lemma 2. Let t ≥ 3. If Y1,Y2, ...Yt are t subsets of X such that Y1 = {a1} and, for any
τ ∈ {2, ..., t}, Yτ is the non-consensual best response to Yτ−1 for player 1 when τ is odd and
for player 2 when τ is even, then Yt−2 ⊆ Yt.
Proof. For t = 3 the result is true because non-consensual best responses are sincere,
which implies that Y3 contains a1. For t ≥ 3, suppose that the claim holds for t and let
Y1 = {a1},Y2, ...Yt+1 be iterated non-consensual best responses. We have to prove that
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Yt−1 ⊆ Yt+1. From the induction hypothesis, Yt−2 ⊆ Yt. If Yt−2 = Yt then Yt−1 = Yt+1
because non-consensual best responses are unique, so suppose that
Yt−2 ( Yt,
and suppose also, for a contradiction, that
Yt+1 ( Yt−1.
Without loss of generality, take t even. Figure 1 represents this situation; alter-
natives corresponds to points in the utility space.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Because Yt is the non-consensual response to Yt−1, we know that
Yt−1 ∩Yt = ∅.
For player 1, Yt−1 is the non-consensual best response to Yt−2, thus the points in
Yt \Yt−2 are such that:
∀y ∈ Yt \Yt−2,u1(y) < U1(Yt−1 ∪Yt−2).
Adding these points strictly decreases the payoff to player 1 so that:
U1(Yt−1 ∪Yt) < U1(Yt−1 ∪Yt−2). (a)
Moreover, if, as we have assumed, Yt+1 is a strict subset of Yt−1, then
∀x ∈ Yt−1 \Yt+1,u1(x) > U1(Yt−1 ∪Yt−2),
so that we obtain, combining the previous observation with (a):
∀x ∈ Yt−1 \Yt+1,u1(x) > U1(Yt−1 ∪Yt).
Removing the points x from Yt−1 can thus only decrease the average, hence:
U1(Yt+1 ∪Yt) < U1(Yt−1 ∪Yt),
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in contradiction with the fact that Yt+1 is the best response to Yt. This completes the
proof of the lemma.
To complete the proof of the theorem, consider the sequence of strategy profiles
(Y1,Y2), (Y3,Y2), (Y3,Y4), . . . defined above.
If Yt ∩ Yt+1 = ∅ for all t, the previous lemma dictates that the sequences (Y2s)s∈IN
and (Y2s+1)s∈IN are increasing in s. Since the number of alternatives is finite, they
must be stationary from some period onwards. Hence there must exist an equilib-
rium in pure strategies since from this period onwards both players are playing a
best response to each other’s strategy.
If Yτ ∩Yτ+1 , ∅ for at least some τ , take the smallest such τ and denote it by t:
Yt ∩Yt+1 , ∅.
If t = 1, recall that Y1 = {a1}, then Yt+1 ∩ Yt , ∅ just means that a1 ∈ Y2, which
implies that the same alternative a1 = b1 is preferred by both players. Then ({a1}, {a1})
is an equilibrium.
If t > 1 then
Yt−1 ∩Yt = ∅
by definition of t. Without loss of generality, suppose that t is even, so that Yt is
played by player 2 and Yt−1 and Yt+1 are played by player 1. (The same claims hold
if t is odd by exchanging the roles of the players.) Hence Yt+1 is a consensual best
response for player 1 to Yt.
We represent the argument in Figure 2 in which, again, alternatives are repre-
sented by points in the utility space.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
We know that we can write for some i: Yt+1 = [ai ,+]1, with
{ai} = Yt ∩Yt+1.
To prove that (Yt+1,Yt) is an equilibrium, we just have to prove that Yt is a best
response for player 2 to Yt+1.
Because ai ∈ Yt and Yt ∩Yt−1 = ∅, ai < Yt−1, thus
Yt−1 ( [ai ,+]1.
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Consider x in [ai ,+]1 \Yt−1, with x , ai . Then x cannot belong to Yt, for ai is the best
point in Yt for player 1. Define u∗2 = U2(Yt−1 ∪ Yt). Since Yt is a non-consensual best
response, x < Yt implies that u2(x) < U2(Yt−1 ∪ Yt) = u∗2. It follows that the payoff to
player 2 decreases when adding these alternatives x from Yt−1 to Yt+1\[ai ,+]1 so that:
U2([ai−1,+]1 ∪Yt) ≤ u∗2.
Now if the best response of player 2 to [ai ,+]1 is consensual, it cannot yield more
than u2(ai), which is achieved by Yt.
If the best response is non-consensual, it must yield more than u2(ai) and thus be
of the form [bj ,+]2, with u2(bj) > u2(ai). However, then we have:
u2(ai) < U2([ai ,+]1, [bj ,+]2) =U2([ai ,+]1 ∪ [bj ,+]2) ≤U2(Yt−1 ∪ [bj ,+]2).
(Because the alternatives in [ai ,+]1 \ Yt−1 have a payoff of at most u2(ai), player 2
prefers them to be removed.) It follows that
u∗2 < u2(ai) ≤U2(Yt−1, [bj ,+]2),
in contradiction with the fact that the best response to Yt−1 yields u∗2.
We conclude that the consensual response Yt is optimal. It follows that (Yt+1,Yt)
is an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
5 Random Lower Bound
Once we have established the existence of pure strategy equilibria, we focus on the
properties satisfied by the Approval Mechanism.
We start by considering the lowest expected utility a player might get in equi-
librium. As will be observed below, in any equilibrium, each player gets at least his
mean (and his median) expected utility.
We define the average outcome as the one given by the tie among all the candi-
dates, i.e. the winning set X. For i = 1,2, denoting k = #X:
Ui(X) =
1
k
∑
x∈X
Ui(x).
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The following condition is the natural expected utility version of equal division
lower bound and is often present in the literature in fair allocation rules.
Random Lower Bound (RLB) : An outcome W ⊆ X satisfies Random Lower Bound
if it gives at least the mean outcome to both players.
This condition is rather mild and intuitive. Indeed, randomness is often used as
a device for making a “fair” choice when discriminating between alternatives in the
absence of objective reasons.
Yet, as has been shown by the discussion in Section 2, no deterministic procedure
that assigns an alternative to any utility vector can satisfy it.
On the contrary, the Approval Mechanism satisfies RLB in any voting situation.
In order to show this claim, we introduce the notion of uniform sincerity, extensively
discussed in the early works on Approval Voting (see Merill [1979], Merill and Nagel
[1987] and references therein). It can be defined as follows:
Uniform Sincerity: A player’s choice is uniformly sincere if she votes for pre-
cisely those candidates whose utility exceeds the average. More formally, for each
player i, the uniformly sincere ballot is
Si = {x ∈ X |ui(x) > Ui(X)}.
Uniform Sincerity is optimal for a player with a uniform belief on the other play-
ers’ strategies (Ballester and Rey-Biel [2009]). In our setting, the purely sincere bal-
lot plays the role of a benchmark since it ensures that the player gets at least the
mean utility.
Theorem 2. For any pure strategy of the opponent, uniform sincerity delivers to the player
at least her mean utility.
Theorem 2, the proof of which is included in the appendix, directly implies that
any equilibrium must satisfy Random Lower Bound, and hence we state the follow-
ing corollary without proof.
Corollary 1. The Approval Mechanism satisfies Random Lower Bound.
Notice that this very simple result does not hold for more than two players. For
instance, if two players out of three agree on an alternative, this may be an equilib-
rium outcome even if it is very detrimental to the third player.
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As usual in fair division problems, it is not obvious whether requiring the mean
outcome for every player is more appealing than requiring the median one. As
we now show, this problem is absent from our setting since the median outcome
is equivalent to the mean one.
Formally, for any W ⊆ X and some player i, we let Li(W ) andHi(W ) respectively
denote the number of outcomes (i.e. uniform lotteries) that deliver the player i lower
and higher expected utility thanW . Formally, Li(W ) = #{V ⊆ X |Ui(V ) < Ui(W )} and
Hi(W ) = #{V ⊆ X |Ui(V ) > Ui(W )}.
We define the median outcome for player i as the one given by the outcome W
with Li(W ) = Hi(W ). As we consider the set of outcomes are the uniform lotteries,
we now prove that the median outcome coincides with the mean one.
Lemma 3. The Mean outcome equals the Median one.
Proof. By definition, the mean outcome is the tie among all candidates in X. Hence,
its expected utility equals Ui(X) with Ui(X) =
1
k
∑
x∈X ui(x) for each player i. Assume
that player i prefers the victory of some subset W of size j < k to the one of X so that
1
j
∑
x∈W
ui(x) >
1
k
∑
x∈X
ui(x)⇐⇒ k
∑
x∈W
ui(x) > j
∑
x∈X
ui(x). (2)
Simple algebra proves that (2) is equivalent to (k − j)∑x∈W ui(x) > j∑x∈X\W ui(x).
Consider now that player i prefers X over X \W so that:
1
k
∑
x∈X
ui(x) >
1
k − j
∑
x∈X\W
ui(x) >⇐⇒ (k − j)
∑
x∈X
ui(x) > k
∑
x∈X\W
ui(x). (3)
Again simple algebra proves that (3) is equivalent to (k−j)∑x∈W ui(x) > j∑x∈X\W ui(x).
Hence, as (2) and (3) are equivalent, it follows that player i prefers some winning set
W to X if and only if she prefers X to X \W .
Note that this implies that Li(X) = Hi(X) since whenever a player prefers some
set to X, she also prefers X to its complementary (note that we have assumed a
player is never indifferent between two different winning sets). In other words, the
complete tie delivers the median expected utility, as wanted. Q.E.D.
One could argue that the axiom of Random Lower Bound is quite mild since it
is trivial to satisfy. For instance, one can consider simultaneous or dynamic mech-
anisms with an outside option for both players which generates the lottery over X.
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However, is it possible to design mechanisms that give strictly more utility to both
players than the lottery over X for every utility profile? As will be shown now, this is
not possible. In this sense, the random lower bound is the highest minimal utility
level for both players one can design.
Let L(X) denote the set of all uniform lotteries over X. A social choice correspon-
dence (SCC) f is a mapping f : U1 × U2 → L(X). For each u = (u1,u2), f (u) ⊆ L(X)
denotes the outcome of the SCC.
Lemma 4. There is no SCC than can ensure both players a utility strictly higher than
U (X).
Proof. Let k = #X denote the number of alternatives. Let u1 denote the utility vec-
tor for player 1. Let u2 such that u2(j) = u1(k − j) for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Hence, the
preferences are perfectly opposed. As argued by Lemma 3, the lottery over all the
elements of X is the median outcome. Assume that we require a social choice corre-
spondence to give strictly more utility than U (X) to player 1. Since the preferences
are perfectly opposed and U (X) denotes the median outcome, any lottery that gives
strictly more utility than U (X) to player 1 must give less utility than U (X) to player
2, proving the claim. Q.E.D.
6 Partial Honesty and Sincerity
We now evaluate whether the approval game triggers sincerity. As usual in the study
of approval voting, a strategy is sincere if, given the lowest-ranked alternative that
a player approves of, she also approves of all alternatives ranked higher (see Brams
and Fishburn [1983-2007] and Laslier and Sanver [2010]). Formally,
Definition 1. A ballot B is sincere for a player i if (ui(x) > ui(y) and y ∈ B)⇒ x ∈ B.
The set of sincere ballots for player i is denoted by S(Bi). Note that this sincer-
ity notion is rather weak since a player can hesitate between several such ballots,
nevertheless, the next example proves that the players need not approve their most
preferred alternative in equilibrium.
Example 1: Let X = {a,b,c,d,e} with:
u1 = (100,0,90,20,40), and u2 = (100,0,90,40,20).
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There is an equilibrium (ce;cd) in which neither of the players vote for their most
preferred alternative. To see why, consider player 1’s decision problem. Given that 2
votes cd, player 1 needs to determine the ballot B1 that maximizes his utility. Given
the different ballots B1 ∈ B1, he might obtain the following winning sets:
{c,d,cd,acd,bcd,cde,abcd,acde,bcde,abcde},
which respectively deliver the expected utilities:
{90,20,110/2,210/3,110/3,150/3,210/4,250/4,150/4,250/5}.
His best response is then to pick a ballot that leads to the election of c; ce is hence a
best response. Since the players have symmetric preferences (with a switch between
d and e), the same argument proves the claim for player 2, showing that (ce;cd) is an
equilibrium.
In the remainder of the paper, we assume that in case of an equal outcome, in-
dividuals prefer to bargain by reporting those alternatives that provide more utility
than the least approved one.
As will be shown, the very mild assumption of partial honesty is enough to re-
store sincere best responses. In order to define this behavioral assumption, we de-
note by i the individual’s ordering over the strategy profiles (Bi ,B−i) in B. Its asym-
metric component is denoted by i .
Definition 2 (Dutta and Sen [2012]). A player i is partially honest whenever for all
(Bi ,B−i), (B′i ,B−i) ∈ B.
(i) If Ui(Bi ,B−i) ≥Ui(B′i ,B−i) and Bi ∈ S(Bi), B′i < S(Bi), then (Bi ,B−i) i (B′i ,B−i).
(ii) In all other cases, (Bi ,B−i) i (B′i ,B−i) iff Ui(Bi ,B−i) ≥Ui(B′i ,B−i).
The first part of the definition represents the individual’s partial preference for
honesty — he strictly prefers the strategy profile (Bi ,B−i) to (B′i ,B−i) when he plays
sincerely in (Bi ,B−i), but not in (B′i ,B−i) provided the outcome corresponding to
(Bi ,B−i) is at least as good as that corresponding to (B′i ,B−i). The second part of
the definition is standard.
The preference profile (1,2) now defines a modified normal form game. We
omit formal definitions for the sake of brevity. Note that Theorem 1 ensures the
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existence of an equilibrium of the original game in which players’s strategies are
sincere (by construction). Therefore the same strategy profile is also an equilibrium
of the modified game, and we can state without further proof:
Theorem 3. The game with partially honest players has a pure strategy equilibrium.
Notice that the sincerity property is in fact true not only in the equilibrium we
previously built but in any pure equilibrium of the modified game.
Theorem 4. In any pure strategy equilibrium of the game with partially honest players,
all the players use sincere strategies.
Proof. It is well known that under Approval Voting, for every pure strategy of the
other players, the set of pure best replies contains a sincere best response (see De Si-
nopoli et al. [2006] and Endriss [2013]). Hence, in any pure strategy equilibrium,
every player is indifferent between casting a honest ballot or a dishonest one. Since
the players are assumed to be partially honest, the result follows. Q.E.D.
7 Pareto Efficiency
We now consider the Pareto properties of the approval equilibria. Compared to most
of the theoretical bargaining literature, our setting is unusual in the sense that it only
considers uniform lotteries among the different alternatives.
Our analysis focuses on three main aspects: the Lottery Pareto Efficiency, the
milder of Pure Pareto Efficiency and finally the results dealing with implementation
theory.
Lottery Pareto Efficiency
An outcome W ⊆ X Pareto dominates an outcome V ⊆ X, if Ui(W ) > Ui(V ) for both
i = 1,2. Hence, the most intuitive notion of Pareto dominance is as follows:
Lottery Pareto Efficiency (LPE) : An outcome W is Lottery Pareto Efficient if it is not
Pareto dominated by a uniform lottery.
The Approval mechanism encompasses some notion of Pareto efficiency. Indeed,
as will be shown by Theorem 5, every equilibrium satisfies the strong notion of LP E
as long as there are just three alternatives.
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Theorem 5. Let k = 3. Every equilibrium satisfies Lottery Pareto Efficiency.
The proof is included in the Appendix. It is constructive and describes for each
possible vector u, the set of equilibria outcomes. Yet, this positive result does not
extend to any number of alternatives. Indeed, in the next example with four alter-
natives, the unique equilibrium does not satisfy Lottery Pareto Efficiency.
Example 2: Let X = {a,b,c,d} and assume that the utility vector is:
u1 = (100,75,45,0) u2 = (0,45,75,100).
In this society, the outcome bc Pareto dominates the outcome abcd. Indeed, the
former one gives an expected utility of 60 to each player whereas the second one
gives 55. However, B = (ab;cd), yielding the outcome abcd is the unique equilibrium
of the game. Q.E.D.
Pure Pareto Efficiency
Yet, even if LP E does not hold, some notion of Pareto optimality is incorporated
in the Approval Mechanism. As will be shown, under the assumption of partial
honesty, all equilibria satisfy the next notion of Pareto efficiency: it entails that there
is no alternative that Pareto dominates the winning set.
Pure Pareto Efficiency (PPE): An outcomeW is Pure Pareto Efficient if it is not Pareto
dominated by any pure alternative.
Theorem 6. With partially honest players, every equilibrium satisfies Pure Pareto Effi-
ciency.
The proof is structured in the Lemmata 5,6 and 7. In each of these Lemmata, it
is assumed that both players are partially honest.
Lemma 5. In a unanimous society, the winning set satisfies Pure Pareto Efficiency.
Proof. Let a denote the unanimously preferred alternative. It follows that a is in-
cluded in any best response of the players. Therefore, a wins in any equilibrium,
proving the claim. Q.E.D.
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Lemma 6. In a non-unanimous society, a non-consensual equilibrium satisfies Pure Pareto
Efficiency.
Proof. Let B = (B1,B2) be a non-consensual equilibrium. Assume that there is some
y ∈ X for which ui(y) > Ui(B1,B2) =Ui(B1∪B2) for both i = 1,2. Lemma 3 entails that
B1 ∩B2 = ∅, and for any player i ∈ {1,2}, Bi = {x ∈ X : ui(x) > Ui(B1 ∪B2)}. Therefore,
the score of y equals 2, which contradicts B being a non-consensual equilibrium,
proving the claim. Q.E.D.
Lemma 7. In a non-unanimous society, a consensual equilibrium satisfies Pure Pareto
Efficiency.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that the winning set of a consensual equilibrium
B is not Pure Pareto Efficient. As previously argued, this winning set is a singleton
which we denote by x. Since x is not Pareto efficient, there is some y ∈ X such that
ui(y) > ui(x) for both i = 1,2. Moreover, since the score of x equals 2, both players
vote for x. There are three possibilities for the score of y given B, denoted sy(B).
Assume first that sy(B)=0. No player has voted for y. Hence, since sx(B) = 2,
adding one point to y does not modify the winning set. Since each player is partially
honest, she must approve of y, contradicting sy(B) = 0.
Assume now that sy(B)=1. W.l.o.g. assume that player 1 has approved of y
whereas player 2 has not. If player 2 modifies his pure strategy and ceases to vote for
x and votes for y, then y is the unique element in the winning set. Since u2(y) > u2(x),
B is not an equilibrium, since player 2 is not playing a best response.
Finally, assume that sy(B) = 2. Then there are at least two alternatives in the win-
ning set of this consensual equilibrium. But we already noticed that in a consensual
equilibrium, the winning set is a singleton.
Therefore, the winning set of a consensual equilibrium satisfies Pure Pareto Effi-
ciency. Q.E.D.
Implementation Theory
As will be shown, there is no hope of implementing in pure strategies a social choice
correspondence that satisfies together the axioms of Random Lower Bound and Pure
Pareto Efficiency. The tension between implementability in pure strategies and Pure
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Pareto Efficiency was emphasized earlier by Hurwicz and Schmeidler [1978] and
Maskin [1999], but their results do not directly imply the described impossibility,
because our mechanism applies to the specific context in which the game outcomes
are uniform lotteries over the set of the alternatives. More recently, Dutta and Sen
[2012] proved that the Pareto correspondence itself is not implementable when both
players are partially honest.
Let L(X) denote the set of all uniform lotteries over X. A social choice corre-
spondence (SCC) f is a correspondence f : U1 × U2 → L(X). For each u = (u1,u2),
f (u) ⊆ L(X) denotes the outcome of the SCC.
Definition 3. A SCC f is fully implementable if there exists a game form Γ such that for
each u ∈ U1 × U2, all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of (Γ ,u) have the same outcome,
and this outcome is f (u).
Proposition 1. There is no SCC that is implementable in pure strategies that satisfies
Random Lower Bound and Pure Pareto Efficiency.
Proof. The proof extends the one of De Clippel et al. [2013] to cardinal utilities.
Let u = (u1,u2) be a utility profile on {a,b,c,d,e} with u1 = (100,53,52,1,0) and u2 =
(0,1,52,53,100). Players 1 and 2 have opposed preferences. Moreover, if a RSCF
satisfies RLB and LP E, it must be the case that f (u) = c since it is the unique lottery
which satisfies both desiderata. Then, denoting by v1 = (52,1,100,0,53) and v2 =
(52,1,53,0,100), Maskin Monotonicity (a necessary condition for implementation in
pure strategies) implies that f (v) = c for v = (v1,v2).
We now consider the profile w = (w1,w2) with w1 = (53,1,100,0,52) and w2 =
(1,53,0,100,52). The conditions of RLB and LP E jointly imply that f (w) = e. More-
over, since f satisfies Maskin monotonicity, it must be the case that f (v) = e. But this
entails a contradiction with f (v) = c, proving the claim. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2. Assume that both players are partially honest. There is no SCC that
is implementable in pure strategies and satisfies Random Lower Bound and Pure Pareto
Efficiency.
Proof. Proposition 1 in Dutta and Sen [2012] implies no SCC which contains the
union of the best-ranked alternatives of the two players is implementable even when
both individuals are partially honest. As shown by the introductory example in
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Section 2, there exists preference profiles (when preferences are perfectly opposed
and for some specification of cardinal utilities) for which RLB and P P E single out
the union of the best-ranked alternatives as the unique acceptable lottery proving
the claim. Q.E.D.
8 Variations
This section focuses on two intuitive variations on the current work. We first con-
sider the role of mixed strategies and show that while the property of Random Lower
Bound still holds with mixed strategies, the incentives for sincerity may disappear
if both players randomize. The second variation extends the framework in two di-
rections. Building on the literature on preferences over sets (see ?), we allow any
tie-breaking rule and we also relax the assumption that the players are expected
utility maximizers. We then give sufficient conditions over preferences over sets to
ensure that each player has always a sincere best response and at the same, the game
admits a pure strategy equilibrium.
8.1 Mixed strategies
Up to now, we have focused on pure strategy equilibria. In this section, we analyze
whether the previous properties of the Approval Mechanism are still valid when
mixed strategy equilibria are also taken into account.
Random Lower Bound The property of Random Lower Bound still holds in any
mixed strategy equilibrium, because a player can always play the pure sincere strat-
egy that ensures to her at least her mean utility (Theorem 2). We thus can state:
Theorem 7. The Approval Mechanism satisfies Random Lower Bound in mixed strate-
gies.
Sincerity. The next example will prove that there might exist equilibria in which one
of the players strictly prefers to play insincerely. Note that the violation of Sincerity
must be in mixed strategies, since in pure strategies, the set of best responses always
includes a sincere one (and hence partial honesty removes insincere equilibria in
pure strategies).
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Let X = {a,b,c,d,e} and assume that the players’ utilities are as follows:
u1 = (100,75,
200
3
,
175
3
,0), and u2 = (65,
3200
49
,35,0,100).
Consider the strategy profile σ in mixed strategies with
σ1(ac) = 0.9, and σ1(acd) = 0.1,
and
σ2(e) = 0.15, σ2(be) = 0.25 and σ2(abe) = 0.6.
In this profile, player 1 does not respect sincerity since the two ballots in his
support are insincere in the sense that they skip candidate b. Moreover, player 1
votes for his preferred alternative and for c and d, the least two preferred alternatives
of player 2. This creates an uncertainty for player 2 that leads him to mix among
three of his sincere strategies.
As will now be shown, σ is an equilibrium, so that we can state the next result.
Theorem 8. Insincerity might be a strict best response in equilibrium when players use
mixed strategies.
To understand the intuition, consider the next table, in which the pure strategies
of player 1 are the rows, whereas thoses of player 2 are the columns.
e be abe
ac ace abce a
acd acde abcde a
ab abe b ab
In the table are represented the winning sets so that, for instance, the winning
set that corresponds to the strategy pair (ac,e) (first column, first row) is ace. Since
U1(acd,e) > U1(ac,e) andU1(acd,be) < U1(ac,be), it follows that player 1 is indifferent
between playing ac and acd when player 2 plays σ2. Indeed, the figures are such that
σ2(e)
(100 + 2003 )
3
+ σ2(be)
(175 + 2003 )
4
= σ2(e)
(100 + 3753 )
4
+ σ2(be)
(175 + 3753 )
5
.
A symmetric argument applies to player 2 when player 1 plays σ1. Note that, in
equilibrium, player 2 is indifferent between his three strategies in the support: e, be
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and abe. Since abe leads to the victory of a given σ1, this implies that
U2(σ1,be) =U2(σ1, abe) = u2(a) = 65.
To see why this the case, note that
U2(σ1,be) =
9
10
200
3
+
1
10
200
4
= 65,
and
U2(σ1, abe) =
9
10
200 + b∗
4
+
1
10
200 + b∗
5
= 65,
with b∗ = 320049 .
The rest of the proof is included in Appendix C.
Partial honesty does not remove this equilibrium. Indeed, it can be shown that
U1(ac,σ2) > U1(B1,σ2) for any sincere ballot B1. For instance, take the pure strategy
ab. We have that U1(ab,e) > U1(ac,e) and U1(ab,be) > U1(ac,be). However, since
U1(ab,abe) < U1(ac,abe), player 2 playing σ2 ensures that player 1 prefers ac to ab
and to any other sincere ballot.
8.2 Alternative Tie-Breaking Rules
This last section addresses an extension of this work that deals with the tie-breaking
rule. So far, we have used the uniform tie-breaking rule: whenever two or more
alternatives were tied, we have assumed that one of them is selected at random.
Arguably in our context, this seems to be “the most natural choice for a tie-breaking
mechanism” (Endriss [2013]), and, for a more formal justification, one could refer to
the axiomatization of uniform expected utility due to ?.
Yet, it seems important to understand whether our results depend on this as-
sumption. The mechanism first takes a pair of subsets of alternatives, merges them
into an outcome which is either the intersection (if the intersection is non empty)
or the union (if the intersection is empty). The outcome can be any subset of alter-
natives. Then the players evaluate possible outcomes by computing expected utility
under uniform rule. This combines a tie-breaking rule (a single alternative is chosen
at random uniformly) and a behavioral assumption (expected utility maximization).
Indeed, there is a vast literature in social choice theory that extends preferences over
alternatives to preferences over sets of alternatives (see ?). We now prove that our re-
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sults would be not modified if we depart from the uniform-tie breaking rule and/or
allow the players not be expected-utility maximizers.
For any pair of alternatives, let xRiy denote that i weakly prefers x to y and let P
denote the strict preference: xPiy if xRiy and not yRix.
We now consider individual preferences directly for sets of alternatives. That
is we do not anymore assume that each player derives his preferences over game
outcomes by computing his expected utility over this set. Note that any tie-breaking
rule compatible with our assumptions is a-priori allowed.
A preference over sets of alternatives is a weak order D on 2X . The binary relation
D is assumed to be complete, reflexive and transitive. We write A .i B if A Di B but
not B Di A and A −i B if both A Di B and B Di A. The weak order Di may depend
on the preferences over alternatives Ri but also on the beliefs of player i over the
tie-breaking rule. Following the previous genericity assumption, which ruled out
indifferences, we impose that for any pair A,B ∈ 2X and any i = 1,2,
eitherA.i B orB .i A.
The preference profile (D1,D2) now defines a modified normal form game, best
responses being defined with respect to the relation D. For any strategy Z of player
j, the set of best responses of player i is:
Ri(Z) = {Y ∈ 2X |W (Y ,Z) Di W (Y ′,Z) for anyY ′ ∈ 2X}.
We now recall some principles for extending preferences over alternatives to
preferences over sets of alternatives.12 For any set A ∈ 2X , we write maxi(A) to de-
note the set maximal alternatives in A for player i. Hence:
max
i
(A) = {x ∈ X | xPiy for any y ∈ X}.
Kelly Principle: For any A ∈ 2X and any x,y ∈ X, we have:
IND {x} .i {y} if xPiy.
12 Endriss [2013] gives conditions for the existence of a sincere best response under Approval vot-
ing under different preference extensions. More specifically, he proves that this is the case if a player’s
preferences over sets of alternatives follows the Kelly Principle, the ADD axioms and some replace-
ment axiom a` la Sen.
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MAX {maxi(A)} Di A.
Addition-Deletion Axioms. For any A ∈ 2X and any x ∈ X,
ADD A \ {x} .i A ifA.i {x}.
DEL A∪ {x} .i A if {x} .i A.
We now prove that if the player’s preferences satisfy the Kelly Principle and the
Addition-Deletion axioms, then the game with extended preferences admits a pure
strategy equilibrium and, moreover, there is always a sincere best response. This
implies that our results are not altered if we replace the tie-breaking rule and the
assumption of expected utility maximization with the previously described require-
ments.
Theorem 9. Assume that the players’ preferences satisfy the Kelly Principle and the
Addition-Deletion axiom. Then in the game with preferences (D1,D2):
1. a player always has a sincere best response.
2. there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in sincere strategies.
Proof.
1. The proof is done for player 1 w.l.o.g. Let Z denote player 2’s strategy for some
Z ∈ 2X . The player has two classes of best responses: consensual and non-consensual
ones.
Consensual Best Responses: Consider first the consensual best responses. Any
such best response is some set Y ∈R1(Z) with Y ∩Z , ∅ and W (Y ,Z) = Y ∩Z.
Let {y0} = max1(Z). Note that the strategy [y0,+]1 is sincere and leads to the out-
come W ([y0,+]1,Z) = {y0}. We claim that any consensual best response must lead to
the same outcome than [y0,+]1, proving that this strategy is a sincere best response.
Assume by contradiction that there is some consensual best response Y with
W (Y ,Z) = Y ∩Z , {y0}.
If y0 ∈ Y ∩Z, then, by MAX, {y0} D1 Y ∩Z, proving that [y0,+]1 is a best response.
If y0 < Y ∩Z, then let {x0} = max1(Y ∩Z). By MAX, it follows that {x0} D1 Y ∩Z.
Moreover, by IND, {y0} .1 {x0}. Hence, by transitivity, {y0} .1 Y ∩Z, proving that Y is
not a best response.
This concludes the proof for the consensual best responses.
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Non-Consensual Best Responses: Consider now the non-consensual best re-
sponses. A non-consensual best response is some Y ∈ R1(Z) with Y ∩ Z = ∅ and
W (Y ,Z) = Y ∪Z.
Due to ADD, for any alternative y with {y} .1 Z, we have Z ∪ {y} .1 Z.
Moreover, due to DEL, for any alternative y with Z .1 {y}, we have Z \ {y} .1 Z.
Combining the previous observations leads to show that the unique non-consensual
best response Y satisfies:
Y = {y ∈ X | {y} .1 Z}.
Since Y is sincere, this concludes the proof for the part 1.
2. The existence proof basically hinges on the preferences of the players over the
winning sets. To see that the claim is correct, it suffices to see that the the Kelly
Principle and the Addition-Deletion axiom are enough to compare all the different
winning sets that appear in the proof. We omit the proof of this result for the sake
of brevity13. Q.E.D.
9 Conclusion
We have introduced the Approval Mechanism, a two-person dispute-resolution de-
vice, which has the virtue of being very simple to implement and exhibits three
main appealing properties: First, the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in
which both players play sincere strategies. Second, the flexibility of the mechanism
ensures that both players get at least their mean (and median) expected utility in
every equilibrium. This is a basic requirement in dispute resolution settings like
ours, but it cannot be satisfied by a scoring rule nor by a deterministic mechanism.
Third, any equilibrium satisfies Lottery Pareto Efficiency with three alternatives and
Pure Pareto Efficiency for any arbitrarily large number of alternatives. As has been
shown, the tension between the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium and Pure
Pareto Efficiency is not absent from our setting, as previously emphasized by the
Nash implementation literature. However, while the Approval mechanism partially
implements the set of lotteries satisfying both P P E and RLB, we prove that no mech-
anism can fully implement this set.
13 A self-contained proof is available in the on-line appendix.
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Our device is hence particularly well-fitted to ensure a minimal degree of impar-
tiality while taking into account the players’ intensities of preferences. Ours is hence
a pioneering work in applying a voting device to a dispute resolution environment.
Note that the properties of this mechanism depend on the environment with two
players, since each player has more “power” with respect to the final outcome in the
current case than in a large election. For instance, the property of Random Lower
Bound is a consequence of the setting with just two-players.
The counterintuitive results in mixed strategies (as far as sincerity is concerned)
confirm that the pure strategy equilibria are the more reasonable framework to the-
oretically predict the players’ reactions to the Approval Mechanism. Indeed, one
may doubt that the probability distributions over the outcomes that might arise in
a mixed strategy equilibrium accurately represent the players’ beliefs when facing
uncertainty over the opponent’s strategy.
Finally, understanding the properties of the current mechanism under incom-
plete information over the players’ preferences seems to be a potentially interesting
venue of research.
A Appendix: A Characterization of Non-Consensual Equi-
libria
Proposition 3. For a non-unanimous society, a strategy profile B = (B1,B2) is a non-
consensual equilibrium if and only if B1 ∩B2 = ∅ and for any player i ∈ {1,2},
Bi = {x ∈ X : ui(x) > Ui(B1 ∪B2)}.
Proof. 1.=⇒) Let B = (B1,B2) be a non-consensual equilibrium of the game. Then it
follows that B1∩B2 = ∅, as otherwise some alternative would have a score of 2 contra-
dicting the fact that B is a non-consensual equilibrium. Moreover, assume, by con-
tradiction, that there is some i for which some y ∈ Bi satisfies ui(y) < Ui(B1∪B2). Let
j = #{B1 ∪B2}. The previous inequality is equivalent to: ui(y) < 1j
∑
x∈B1∪B2 ui(x)⇐⇒
(j −1)ui(y) <∑x∈B1∪B2\{y}ui(x). However it is simple to see that the previous inequal-
ity is equivalent to:
(j − 1)
∑
x∈B1∪B2
ui(x) < j
∑
x∈B1∪B2\{y}
ui(x)⇐⇒ 1j
∑
x∈B1∪B2
<
1
j − 1
∑
x∈B1∪B2\{y}
ui(x).
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In other words, ui(y) < Ui(B1 ∪ B2) if and only if Ui(B1 ∪ B2) < Ui(B1 ∪ B2 \ {y}).
However, since y ∈ Bi , the previous inequality proves that i is not playing a best
response, proving that B is not an equilibrium.
2.⇐=) Let B = (B1,B2) be a strategy profile. Assume that B1 ∩B2 = ∅ and for any
player i ∈ {1,2} and any alternative x ∈ X, Bi = {x ∈ X : ui(x) > Ui(B1 ∪ B2)}. Since
B1∩B2 = ∅, then the maximum score of an alternative equals one. Furthermore, any
x ∈ Bi satisfies ui(x) > Ui(B1 ∪ B2). As previously shown, for any alternative y ∈ X,
ui(y) < Ui(B1 ∪B2) is equivalent to Ui(B1 ∪B2) < Ui(B1 ∪B2 \ {x}). Hence, a player ’s
best response equals all the alternatives x ∈ X such that ui(x) > Ui(B1 ∪ B2), which
coincides with Bi . Therefore, B is a non-consensual equilibrium, proving the claim.
Q.E.D.
B Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose that player j plays some pure strategy denoted Bj . The expected utility for
player i when he plays the uniformly sincere ballot Si and player j plays ballot Bj
equals:
Ui(Si ,Bj) =
 Ui(Si ∩Bj) if Si ∩Bj , ∅,Ui(Si ∪Bj) if Si ∩Bj = ∅.
If Si ∩Bj , ∅, it follows that Ui(Si ∩Bj) > Ui(X) since each x ∈ Si satisfies ui(x) >
Ui(X).
If, on the contrary, Si ∩ Bj = ∅, then we let X \ Si = Bj ∪Cj with #Si = l,#Bj = m
and #Cj = k − l −m. In other words, X = Si ∪Bj ∪Cj .
If Cj = ∅, then X = Si ∪Bj , so that Ui(Si ,Bj) =Ui(X) as wanted.
If Cj , ∅, then by definition, we can write that
Ui(Si ∪Bj) > Ui(X)⇐⇒ 1l +m
∑
x∈Si∪Bj
ui(x) >
1
k
∑
x∈X
ui(x),
which is equivalent to
(k − l −m)(
∑
x∈X
ui(x)) > k
∑
x∈Cj
ui(x)⇐⇒ 1k
∑
x∈X
ui(x) >
1
k − l −m
∑
x∈Cj
ui(x).
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The last inequality holds since, by definition, any x ∈ Cj satisfies ui(x) < Ui(X), prov-
ing the claim. Q.E.D.
C Appendix: Proof of Theorem 5
We let k = 3 so that X = {a,b,c}. W.l.o.g. we assume that u1(a) > u1(b) > u1(c).
It follows that this player has the following ranking over the different winning
sets. If u1(b) > U1({a,c}), then:
U1({a}) > U1({a,b}) > U1({b}) > U1({a,b,c}) > U1({a,c}) > U1({b,c}) > U1({c}),
whereas if the cardinal utilities satisfy U1(b) < U1({a,c}), the ranking equals:
U1({a}) > U1({a,b}) > U1({a,c}) > U1({a,b,c}) > U1({b}) > U1({b,c}) > U1({c}).
We now evaluate the set of equilibria for each possible preference ordering of the
player 2, and prove that it satisfies LP E.
There are six possible permutations of the three alternatives to be analyzed.
Case 1: u2(a) > u2(b) > u2(c).
The unique equilibrium outcome is the election of a.
Case 2: u2(a) > u2(c) > u2(b).
The same argument as in Case 1 proves the claim.
Case 3: u2(b) > u2(a) > u2(c).
In this case, the unique equilibrium is B = (a;b), which leads to the winning
set {a,b}. Moreover, this tie is not Pareto dominated by another lottery. Indeed,
U1({a,b}) > U1(W ) for any W ⊆ X \ {a} and U2({a,b}) > U2(W ) for any W ⊆ X \ {b}.
Case 4: u2(b) > u2(c) > u2(a).
In this case, the equilibrium hinges on the players’ preference intensities towards
their middle candidate.
If U1({b}) > U1({a,c}) and U2({c}) > U2({a,b}), then the equilibrium equals B = (ab;bc)
with LP E winning set {b} (since b is the most preferred outcome of player 2).
IfU1({b}) > U1({a,c}) andU2({c}) < U2({a,b}), then the set of equilibria equals B = (a;b)
with LP E winning set {a,b} and B′ = (ab;bc) with LP E winning set {b}.
33
If U1({b}) < U1({a,c}) and U2({c}) > U2({a,b}), then the equilibrium set equals B =
(a;bc) with LP E winning set {a,b,c}.
If U1({b}) < U1({a,c}) and U2({c}) < U2({a,b}), then the equilibrium equals B = (a;b)
with LP E winning set {a,b}.
Case 5: u2(c) > u2(a) > u2(b).
This case is symmetric to Case 4, switching the role of player 1 and 2, proving
the claim.
Case 6: u2(c) > u2(b) > u2(a).
The equilibrium hinges again on the preference intensities towards their middle
ranked candidate.
If U1({b}) > U1({a,c}) and U2({b}) > U2({a,c}), then the equilibrium equals B = (ab;bc)
with LP E winning set {b}.
If U1({b}) > U1({a,c}) and U2({b}) < U2({a,c}), then the equilibrium set equals B =
(ab;c) with LP E winning set {a,b,c}.
If U1({b}) < U1({a,c}) and U2({b}) > U2({a,c}), then the equilibrium equals B = (a;bc)
with LP E winning set {a,b,c}.
If U1({b}) < U1({a,c}) and U2({b}) < U2({a,c}), then the equilibrium equals B = (a;c)
with LP E winning set {a,c}.
Hence, for each possible preference ordering and preference intensities of the
players towards their middle rank candidate, the winning sets at equilibrium satisfy
LP E, concluding the proof.
D Appendix: Proof of the Example of Insincerity as a
Strict Best Response
We now prove that the strategy profile σ = (σ1,σ2) is an equilibrium. Note that since
we assume that players are partially honest, no player can be indifferent between a
sincere and a non-sincere strategy, since partial honesty would remove the equilib-
rium.
Moreover, it is weakly dominated for a player to vote for his preferred alternative
and never approve his least preferred one. For the sake of presentation, only the
34
weakly undominated strategies are considered in the tables. The table on the left
side presents the expected payoffs for each pure weakly undominated strategy for
player 1, whereas the second table presents those for player 2.
e be abe U1(·,σ2)
ac ace abce a 83.4375
acd acde abcde a 83.4375
a ae abe a 82.0833
ab abe b ab 80
abc abce b ab 80.3125
abcd abcde b ab 80.25
ad ade abcde a 82.5
ac acd U2(σ1, ·)
e ace acde 65
be acde abcde 65
ae a a 65
ce c c 35
bce c c 35
ace ac ac 50
abce ac ac 50
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Figure 1: Existence of Equilibrium with Non-Consensual Best Responses.
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Figure 2: Existence of Equilibrium with Consensual Best Responses.
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